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Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids
SARA C. BRONIN
Energy sprawl—the phenomenon of ever-increasing consumption of land, particularly
in rural areas, required to site energy generation facilities—is a real and growing problem.
Over the next twenty years, at least sixty-seven million acres of land will have been
developed for energy projects, destroying wildlife habitats and fragmenting landscapes.
According to one influential report, even renewable energy projects—especially large-scale
projects that require large-scale transmission and distribution infrastructure—contribute to
energy sprawl.
This Article does not aim to stop large-scale renewable energy projects or even argue
that policymakers should focus solely on land use in determining whether energy projects
are allowed to proceed. Rather, it proposes that we advance the legal institutions
necessary to facilitate one possible solution to energy sprawl: the alternative energy
microgrid—that is, small-scale distributed generation between neighbors of energy derived
from sources such as solar collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal
wells, and fuel cells. Microgrids are attractive from a public policy perspective. They
decentralize energy production, reducing the need for massive transmission lines and large
centralized plants. They allow property owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading
the costs and the risk of installation and maintenance among many parties. They provide
cleaner alternatives to conventional energy methods of production. And they improve
system efficiencies by reducing the amount of energy lost during transmission across long
distances to end users.
Despite such benefits, regulatory, political, and economic barriers thwart microgrids.
For example, state laws prohibit or severely limit their viability, while neighbors may
object to living nearby. This Article offers three proposals to address such barriers. First,
Congress should require states to consider a model standard for microgrids, just as it has
required states to consider model standards in other areas of utility law. Second, states
should provide guidance to localities with respect to siting and permitting microgrid
projects. Third, states should develop and authorize legal institutions that would support
microgrid projects, drawing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s proposal for block
improvement districts, which accommodate the public-private nature of shared energy.
Together, these proposals would support small-scale energy sharing collectives whose
emergence could transform the American landscape.
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Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids
SARA C. BRONIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy sprawl—the phenomenon of the ever-increasing consumption
of land,1 particularly in rural areas, required to site energy generation
facilities—is a real and growing problem. Over the next ten years,
significant investment in energy infrastructure will lead to widespread
fragmentation and damage to natural ecosystems and wildlife and bird
habitats.2 Ten years after that, at least sixty-seven million acres of land
will have been developed for energy projects.3 By 2050, demand for
electricity is expected to double, requiring the use of even more land.4
Curbing energy sprawl exceeds the capabilities of local governments, and
even states, as sprawl by definition presents complex cross-jurisdictional
questions.
With demand for energy showing no signs of abating, slowing energy
sprawl will require a multi-faceted approach by all levels of government.
One key component of this approach must be alternative energy
microgrids—that is, small-scale, low-voltage distributed generation5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
1
This Article focuses on land, but energy infrastructure can extend to waters, too. In 2009, the
Obama administration announced a new policy opening federal waters for alternative energy projects
with potentially profound negative impacts on the environment. See President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President on Clean Energy (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Newton-IA/.
2
Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation: Advancing
Conservation Through Landscape-Level Mitigation Planning, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10,023, 10,023 (2010).
3
Darci Palmquist, Energy Production and Nature: What Will the Impacts Be?, THE
CONSERVATION BLOG OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/
2009/08/new-energy-production-nature-impacts-energy-sprawl-renewable-rob-mcdonald/.
4
LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION
18 (2008) [hereinafter THE SMART GRID], available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/Documentsand
Media/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf.
5
The term “distributed generation” refers to the production of electricity by a small-scale source
located at or very near the end users it serves. See THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 12 (defining
“[d]istributed generation” as “the use of small-scale power generation technologies located close to the
load being served, capable of lowering costs, improving reliability, reducing emissions and expanding
energy options”); MARK RAWSON, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION COSTS AND BENEFITS ISSUE PAPER 5
(2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/papers/2004-08-30_RAWSON.PDF (stating that
“[d]istributed [g]eneration is electricity production that is on-site or close to the load center and is
interconnected to the distribution system”); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GLOSSARY,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/index.cfm?id=D#dist_generator (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (defining
“[d]istributed generator” as a “generator that is located close to the particular load that it is intended to
serve”).
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between neighbors for energy derived from sources such as solar
collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel
cells, which have minimal negative impact on the environment.6 Our
current legal regime, and state laws in particular, prohibit or severely limit
such arrangements, thereby facilitating energy sprawl while thwarting
investment in alternative energy resources. As a result, only a handful of
microgrid projects have been built across the country.7 Several of these
projects have been publicly called microgrids but only serve one customer,
so they fall outside of the definition of microgrids used by this Article.
Consider, for example, a homeowner with a solar panel installation
that produces more electricity than she uses. Currently, if she can do
anything at all with the excess electricity, she can only “sell” it back to
local electric utility companies under state rules governing such
transactions, known as net metering.8 This electricity will get redistributed
6
See ROBERT LASSETER ET AL., INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: THE
CERTS MICROGRID CONCEPT 26 (2002), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/50829.pdf (defining the
microgrid as “a semiautonomous grouping of generating sources and enduse sinks that are placed and
operated for the benefit of its member customer(s)”); Thomas E. Hoff et al., Distributed Generation
and Micro-Grids (USAEE/IAEE Conference, 1997), available at http://www.cleanpower.com/research/microgrids/MicroGrids.pdf (defining the microgrid as “an electrically isolated set
of power generator that supply all of the demand of a group of customers”); F. Katiraei & M.R. Iravani,
Transients of a Micro-Grid System with Multiple Distributed Energy Resources 1 (Int’l Conference on
Power Sys. Transients, Paper No. IPST05-080, 2005), available at http://www.ipst.org/
TechPapers/2005/IPST05_Paper080.pdf (defining the microgrid as “a portion of a power system which
includes one or more DG [distributed generation] units capable of operating either in parallel with or
independent from a large utility grid, while providing continuous power to multiple loads and endusers”); Douglas E. King, Electric Power Micro-grids: Opportunities and Challenges for an Emerging
Distributed Energy Architecture 3 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Mellon
University), [hereinafter King, Thesis] available at http://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs_other/
Doug_King_PhD_Thesis_2006.pdf (defining the microgrid as “a small group of customers,
interconnected at low voltages on a local power grid with a single point of interconnection with the area
electric power system”).
7
See Jesse Berst, Macro Trends Point to Microgrids, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Nov. 28, 2006),
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/article_182.html (identifying a CERTS facility, a
subsidiary of a Michigan-based utility offering to build microgrids for commercial and industrial
customers, a prototype microgrid at a Vermont commercial/industrial park, two Wal-Mart microgrids,
and a demonstration project at Sandia National Laboratories); Kerry A. Dolan, Thinking Small About
the Grid, FORBES.COM (Mar. 10, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/10/microgridelectricity-cleantech-technology-breakthroughs-microgrid.html (noting two Wal-Mart microgrids in
Colorado and Texas, a demonstration microgrid installed by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
and a microgrid backup power system at the Santa Rita Jail); Perfect Power at the Illinois Institute of
Technology, GALVIN ELECTRICITY INITIATIVE, http://galvinpower.org/projects/perfect-power-illinoisinstitute-technology (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the microgrid “that will not fail the enduser” at the Illinois Institute of Technology); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary Chu
Announces More than $20.5 Million for Community Renewable Energy Deployment Projects (Jan. 21,
2010),
available
at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/recovery/news_detail.html?news_id=15759
(describing a microgrid project for the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe that includes a biogas digester,
wind turbines, solar panels, a biomass combined heat and power facility, and a University of California
at Davis project that includes biogas, a fuel cell, and a storage battery).
8
Eight states have not allowed for net metering, prohibiting individuals from selling excess
energy produced by their renewable energy technologies back to the local electric utility company.
LAUREL VARNADO & MICHAEL SHEEHAN, NORTH CAROLINA SOLAR CENTER & INTERSTATE
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, CONNECTING TO THE GRID 11 (6th ed. 2009), available at
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through the central transmission facility to other end users, becoming less
efficient the farther it travels. Under the laws of many states, the
homeowner cannot enter into an agreement with her neighbor wherein the
neighbor buys the excess power, lest she be considered to be a public
utility9 and therefore be regulated more heavily than is warranted given the
relatively small scale of her output.
Consider also the situation in which a group of neighbors engages in a
debate as to whether to install a wind turbine in a vacant lot that the city
has given to them for redevelopment. From the city’s perspective, a
turbine would lessen the load on the local utility, which would reduce the
number of unsightly and environmentally disruptive distribution lines
cutting through town. In many jurisdictions, these neighbors can divide
the cost of installing the turbine but can neither centralize operational costs
and pay for their later individual energy use nor connect the turbine to their
individual parcels without violating public utility laws. The likelihood that
either the neighbors invest in the turbine, or that the homeowner invests in
a solar panel whose output exceeds her basic needs, is slim. The cost of
alternative energy has decreased in recent years, but not enough to make
recouping ongoing costs unnecessary for private parties.
Although current state laws prohibit or severely limit alternative
energy microgrids, such arrangements are attractive from a public policy
perspective. They decentralize energy production, reducing the need for
nationwide transmission lines and large-scale centralized plants. They
allow property owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading the
costs and the risk of renewable energy installation and maintenance among
many parties. They provide cleaner alternatives to conventional energy
methods of production. And they improve system efficiencies by reducing
the amount of energy lost during transmission across long distances to endusers. If we agree that alternative energy microgrids are a good idea, then
we must determine how to construct legal regimes that facilitate them. In
furtherance of that goal, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part II sets the stage for the rest of the Article. It begins by describing
the phenomenon of energy sprawl, focusing on the role of the Nature
Conservancy in framing the debate. It then identifies several points of
contention with the concept of energy sprawl, as identified by
environmentalists, politicians, and other advocates. It concludes by
acknowledging that although the energy sprawl phenomenon may be
difficult to accurately measure or predict, a problem exists. A uniform
approach to microgrids would be part of a multi-faceted solution.
Part III articulates the alternative energy microgrid option. It first
http://www.irecusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ConnectDocs/Connecting_to_the_Grid_Guide_6th_
edition-1.pdf (identifying the forty-two states that currently authorize net metering).
9
Note that the term “utility” or “public utility” in this Article encompasses only electric utilities.
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defines the microgrid and several related concepts. It then analyzes how
small-scale distributed generation advances national goals with respect to
energy security, energy independence, and sustainable communities.
Part IV identifies barriers to the microgrid in both state and local law,
focusing on the lack of coordination between various levels of government.
Inconsistent, unclear, and outright hostile laws prevent users from
implementing microgrids. Political considerations also serve as barriers—
most significantly the opposition of public utilities that control most of our
existing energy infrastructure, and neighbors who work through local
governments to halt microgrid projects. Finally, economic factors,
including subsidies of traditional energy infrastructure, work to promote
energy sprawl, while thwarting the microgrid.
After concluding that the key barriers to microgrids relate to
regulation, siting, and institutional development—all areas controlled by
states—Part V recommends three possible paths forward. First, Congress
should tackle energy sprawl by requiring states to consider model
regulations for microgrids. The consideration requirement has encouraged
states to modify their laws to provide nationally recognized
interconnection standards, and I believe upon review states would find
microgrids to be compelling means to meet their own alternative energy
use goals. Second, states should provide guidance to localities with respect
to siting and permitting microgrid projects. This guidance can be issued
without infringing on localities’ core autonomy in regulating land use.
Third, states should authorize new legal institutions that would facilitate
microgrid development. More specifically, states should draw from the
work of Professor Robert Ellickson with respect to block improvement
districts, to authorize block-level energy districts that recognize the
renewable energy produced as a shared public/private resource.
Ultimately, this Article does not aim to halt alternative energy; nor
does it advocate that policymakers focus solely on land use in determining
whether energy projects should proceed. Rather, it attempts to introduce
one solution to curbing energy sprawl via small-scale distributed
generation.
II. ENERGY SPRAWL
Although the Nature Conservancy popularized the term “energy
sprawl” in 2009, the phenomenon has an intuitive explanation. Simply put,
energy sprawl refers to the land required to produce and move energy,
measured in acres per total quantity of energy production. This Part
defines energy sprawl, including jurisdictional issues that affect it. It also
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assesses the recent debate over the Nature Conservancy’s report.
A. The Phenomenon

When Americans think of sprawl, they typically think of urban sprawl:
the unplanned, and often unsightly, expansion of human development into
previously undeveloped rural areas. Urban sprawl, as its name suggests,
develops in roughly concentric circles around cities. In some cases, urban
sprawl is contained within city limits. In other cases, it crosses urban
growth boundaries, into other counties, or even into unincorporated areas.
When urban sprawl warrants government attention, interested jurisdictions
often include a city and a county government or neighboring city
governments. At times, state legislatures weigh in to influence land use
policies, but by and large regulating urban sprawl is a local government
function.
Like urban sprawl, energy sprawl involves expansion into undeveloped
areas. Energy sprawl, however, is linear, not concentric. Traditional
energy infrastructure, which takes the form of generating facilities and
distribution centers connected by transmission lines, looks like a web in
maps.11 Another difference from urban sprawl is that energy sprawl does
not necessarily follow existing settlement patterns. In fact, some of the
largest energy generating facilities may be found in some of the most
underpopulated places in the country.12 Builders of such facilities no doubt
find it easier to locate in places far outside urban boundaries, where fewer
people object and where natural resources like sunlight and wind are easier
to capture. In such areas, only counties or states, or the Bureau of Land
Management if federal land is involved, have jurisdiction over siting.
While extra-urban siting may be attractive for the problems it avoids, it
has significant negative long-term impacts.
In 2009, the Nature
Conservancy’s Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency report focused on one
of these negative impacts: the reach, in purely spatial terms, of different
methods of production. The environmental nonprofit estimated that at
least 206,000 square kilometers—an area larger than the state of
Nebraska—will be impacted by energy development over the next twenty
years if Americans do not substantially increase energy efficiency.13 It
predicted that energy will shift from fossil fuels to methods that may
10

Robert I. McDonald et al., Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency: Climate Policy Impacts on
Natural Habitat for the United States of America, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2009).
11
See Visualizing the U.S. Electric Grid, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=110997398
(offering
a
comprehensive,
interactive map showing energy infrastructure across the country).
12
See Elizabeth Souder, World’s Largest Wind Farm Opens in West Texas, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DN-wind_01bus.
State.Edition1.ddb4af.html.
13
McDonald et al., supra note 10, at 1.
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require greater amounts of land than fossil fuels require.
According to the calculations of the Nature Conservancy, among the
least land-intensive methods of production are nuclear power, using about
two square kilometers to produce a terawatt-hour annually and geothermal,
using an average of seven and a half square kilometers to produce the same
amount of energy.15 Biofuels and biomass, at around 350 and 550 square
kilometers respectively, are among the most land-intensive.16 Somewhere
in the middle are coal, at ten; solar thermal, at fifteen; natural gas, at
nineteen; solar photovoltaic, at thirty-seven; petroleum at forty-five;
hydropower at fifty-four; and wind at seventy-two square kilometers per
annual terawatt-hour.17 The report estimates that the land use figures for
geothermal, natural gas, and wind production can be divided into direct
disturbance of land of about five percent and indirect disturbance,
involving disruptions of larger ecosystems, habitats, and wildlife activity,
for the remaining ninety-five percent.18
To put this analysis in more concrete terms, take an example of one
project using a somewhat land-intensive energy production method, wind
farming. The largest wind farm in the world opened in October 2009,
occupying almost 100,000 acres (or 405 square kilometers) in sparsely
populated West Texas.19 The farm has 627 turbines, with each turbine
taking up, on average, about 160 acres.20 It generates 781.5 megawatts (or
6.8 terawatt-hours, using a conversion of 114 megawatts per terawatt-hour)
and powers 265,000 homes.21 For every megawatt generated, the farm
uses about 128 acres of land (100,000 divided by 781.5 megawatts).
Interestingly, this figure represents more than double the estimated acreage
required to produce a megawatt—60 acres—by the American Wind
Energy Association.22 Converted into the units of measurement used by
14

Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 4. Note that the figures in the text are rounded to the nearest integer. It may also be
important to note that the report does not appear to have included area used in transporting—via rail,
pipelines, or similar means—the fossil fuels. Id. at 8–9.
18
Id. at 4 (“[P]roduction techniques that involve wells like geothermal, natural gas, and petroleum
have about 5% of their impact area affected by direct clearing while 95% of their impact area is from
fragmenting habitats and species avoidance behavior. Wind turbines have a similar figure of about 3–
5% of their impact area affected by direct clearing while 95–97% of their impact area is from
fragmenting habitats, species avoidance behavior, and issues of bird and bat mortality.”). The
American Wind Energy Association has confirmed that for every megawatt of power, sixty acres of
land are needed, although only five percent of needed land area is occupied by the actual turbine.
Resources, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/faq/wwt_environment.html#
What%20are%20wind%20powers%20other%20environmental%20impacts [hereinafter Resources]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
19
Souder, supra note 12.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Resources, supra note 18.
15
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the Nature Conservancy report, in order to produce one terawatt-hour of
energy, the farm requires approximately 60 square kilometers of land (405
square kilometers divided by 6.8 terawatt-hours). Although the number of
acres used by this particular wind farm, 60, is fewer than the 72 square
kilometers estimated by the authors of the Nature Conservancy report, the
report estimate seems reasonable, given this farm’s exceptional size.
Taking this example further reveals how this wind farm contributes to
energy sprawl. To be sure, the turbines occupy a significant amount of
land themselves. Using the industry standard estimate that five percent of
the land in a wind farm is actually used for equipment,23 5,000 acres of
land of the Texas wind farm is likely directly occupied and thus disturbed
by the generating equipment—in this case, turbines. It is unclear whether
this five percent estimate includes the blasting, bulldozing, and digging
required to locate the deep concrete foundations needed to support the
massive steel turbines, or if it includes the roads, substations, and other
facilities that support the turbines. Assuming that it does, the surface of
the remaining 95,000 acres of the wind farm remains open. This open land
may suffer from indirect effects from the construction, operation, and
maintenance of the turbines. Such activities also alter delicate ecologies,
underground and aboveground, as well as landscape vistas.24 Giving new
meaning to the term “climate change,” studies have shown that wind farms
hinder not only weather forecasting,25 but also the natural patterns of
weather itself.26
Birds and other wildlife may be as directly threatened as their habitat.
In California, one wind farm killed so many birds—tens of thousands,
including more than a thousand protected golden eagles—that citizens
brought its owners to court.27 Responding to the alleged facts behind the
23

Id.
See, e.g., Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as
an Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 535, 537 (2007) (stating that critics “view this supposed environmental savior as a
man-made plague on local landscapes and communities, fragmenting habitats, and causing irreparable
ecological damage”).
25
See William Kates, Wind Farms Interfering with Weather Radar in N.Y., USA TODAY, Oct. 13,
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/research/2009-10-13-wind-farms-weatherradar_N.htm (“Wind farms in upstate New York are interfering with National Weather Service Doppler
radars, making it more difficult to detect and assess approaching lake-effect snowstorms.”).
26
See D.B. Barrie & D.B. Kirk-Davidoff, Weather Response to a Large Wind Turbine Array, 10
ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 769, 774 (2010) (testing the effects of an extremely large wind
farm and observing that “[a]tmospheric anomalies initially develop at the wind farm site due to a
slowing of the obstructed wind” and “[t]he anomalies propagate downstream . . . quickly . . .
[suggesting] that predictable influences on weather may be possible”).
27
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 591–92 (Cal Ct.
App. 2008). The court ruled that wildlife and birds are protected by public trust principles, explaining,
“whatever its historical derivation, it is clear that the public trust doctrine encompasses the protection
of undomesticated birds and wildlife.” Id. at 599. The court declined to apply those principles to the
conflict at hand because the plaintiffs had not followed proper protocol in getting the case to court. Id.
at 591, 607.
24
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California case, the American Wind Energy Association stated that
“[d]etailed studies, and monitoring following construction, at other wind
development areas indicate that this is a site-specific issue that will not be
a problem at most potential wind sites.”28 Even if birds and other wildlife
are only minimally threatened by newer wind technologies, critics of wind
energy believe that large-scale wind developments have a devastating
effect on the immediate environment.
Beyond the 100,000 acres, large transmission lines must be built to get
power to the 265,000 homes to be served by the wind farm. These lines
take years to create, given the need to coordinate with private landowners,
and are extremely expensive. Moreover, power lost in transmission is
roughly ten percent.29 Accordingly, energy sprawl costs space, money, and
energy itself.
Despite the many troubling effects of large, out-of-the-way
developments, government continues to direct significant support to
projects with many hundreds or thousands of end users. The Department
of Energy has completed studies showing that the United States could
obtain as much as twenty percent of its electricity from alternative energy
sources such as wind power alone by 2030, much of it to be produced in
large-scale facilities.30 As the government pushes for greater use of
alternative energy, demand by large-scale alternative energy producers for
land also grows. As one measure, the Bureau of Land Management has
received four hundred applications for large solar and wind plants covering
more than two million rural acres.31 The question now is not whether
energy sprawl will occur, but to what extent it may be contained.
B. The Debate
Reaction to the Nature Conservancy’s report has been mixed. Some
have questioned the methods of the report. Others have attempted to use
the report’s findings for political gain. Still others have simply ignored it.
Perhaps the most vehement criticism of the methodology of the report
so far has come from Matthew Wasson, an ecologist and the director of
programs for an environmental nonprofit called Appalachian Voices. He
criticized the report’s reliance on “reports, fact sheets and brochures” to
estimate the number of acres per unit of energy for each method of
28

Resources, supra note 18.
Anya Kamenetz, Why the Microgrid Could Be the Answer to Our Energy Crisis,
FASTCOMPANY.COM (July 1, 2009), http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/137/beyond-thegrid.html?page=0%2C0#self.
30
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY
BY 2030 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/20percent_wind_energy_report_
revOct08.pdf (“A 20% Wind Scenario in 2030, while ambitious, could be feasible if the significant
challenges identified in this report are overcome.”).
31
Kamenetz, supra note 29.
29
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32

production. Wasson also argued that focusing on acreage unacceptably
minimized the environmental impact of coal mining, in particular.33 Coal
mining often involves shearing off mountain tops, disrupting ecosystems,
and polluting waterways, among other negative impacts not included in a
direct land disturbance, or acreage, measure.34 Finally, in Wasson’s
analysis, the term “energy sprawl” armed those who oppose alternative
energy with a catchphrase to frame their opposition. He suggested that
environmentalists “strike that buzzword from their lexicons and literature
entirely.”35
Unfortunately for Wasson, at least one politician quickly took up the
energy sprawl mantle to make a political point. A month after the Nature
Conservancy report was released, U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander wrote an
opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal.36 Drawing from the report’s
statistics regarding the land-intensivity of wind power generation, Senator
Alexander criticized plans of the Obama administration to generate twenty
percent of the nation’s electricity from wind, stating that doing so would
require setting aside a land area the size of West Virginia and constructing
nineteen thousand miles of high-voltage transmission lines.37 In the piece,
Senator Alexander also argued that the country should look more seriously
at nuclear energy, the kind of energy the report identified as being among
the least land-intensive.38
Similarly, advocates of nuclear energy in Iowa believe that the report
supported their push for a second nuclear reactor in the state.39 Other
residents of Iowa, the state with the second highest level of wind energy
production,40 reportedly ignored or rejected the Nature Conservancy’s
assessment.41 The Cedar Rapids-based Gazette interviewed the executive
32

Matt Wasson, Misleading “Energy Sprawl” Study Pollutes Climate Debate, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 1, 2009, 9:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-wasson/misleading-energy-sprawl_b_
306051.html. But see McDonald et al., supra note 10, at 6–7 (identifying the source of most data as the
Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling System, “a comprehensive
econometric model of U.S. energy production, imports, and consumption”).
33
Wasson, supra note 32.
34
See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, THE DIRTY TRUTH ABOUT COAL (June 2007), available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/coal/downloads/coalreport.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Lamar Alexander, Energy “Sprawl” and the Green Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at
A21.
37
Id.
38
Id. (“Before we find ourselves engulfed in energy sprawl, it’s imperative we take a closer look
at nuclear power.”).
39
See David DeWitte, Iowans Not Buying into “Energy Sprawl” Argument, GAZETTE ONLINE
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://gazetteonline.com/local-news/2010/01/19/iowans-not-buying-into-‘energysprawl’-argument (interviewing a nuclear energy advocate).
40
AM. WIND ENERGY ASSOC., ANNUAL WIND INDUSTRY REPORT 8 (2008), available at
http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf (identifying Iowa as
having 1,560 megawatts of wind power capacity, behind Texas with 2,671 megawatts of capacity).
41
See DeWitte, supra note 39 (observing that the Nature Conservatory’s report has drawn little
attention in Iowa).
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director of the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, a group that supports
biofuels. He claimed that the report failed to take into account the fact that
grains for biofuels were being grown as efficiently as ever because of
better seed genetics and agricultural practices.42 In other words, the
report’s focus on land utilized by energy production is deceptive: While
the full environmental impact of activities like coal mining is not taken into
account, the full impact of biofuel production, which can easily be
measured by the number of farms growing crops, is taken into account.
In light of these and other criticisms, the lead author of the report,
Robert McDonald, has explained that the scope of his report was limited.
On behalf of the Nature Conservancy, McDonald said he intended simply
to ensure that land use issues were being considered—along with other
measures such as energy security, cost effectiveness, job creation, energy
independence, and economic issues—as legislation relating to alternative
energy is drafted and implemented.43 He neither intended to provide an
endorsement of nuclear energy nor a critique of renewable energy.44
Rather, he intended to promote “Energy By Design”: avoiding
development when possible, minimizing impacts if development is
necessary, and compensating for unavoidable negative impacts.45 Unlike
Senator Alexander, McDonald praised the Obama administration’s efforts
to permit certain renewable energy projects after thorough environmental
reviews, stating that such a process exemplified the kind of proper
management the report hoped to support.46
From my perspective, the importance of the Nature Conservancy
report did not lie in its specific findings relative to each method of
production, but rather in its identification of an intriguing measure of the
impact of methods of energy production. Intuitively, the findings make
sense: Producing energy impacts land. The lesson is not that alternative
energy should be avoided, but that careful attention must be paid to its
scale and siting.

42

Id.
See Rob McDonald, Energy Sprawl and the Importance of Fact, THE CONSERVATION BLOG OF
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/2009/08/energy-sprawl-ethanolrob-mcdonald/; Rob McDonald, The Lessons I’ve Learned from “Energy Sprawl,” THE
CONSERVATION BLOG OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Sept. 17, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/
2009/09/energy-sprawl-rob-mcdonald-nature-conservancy/ [hereinafter McDonald, Lessons I’ve
Learned] (arguing that land-use impacts are just one of many factors to consider when crafting climate
change legislation).
44
See McDonald, Lessons I’ve Learned, supra note 43. Nuclear energy requires large capital
outlays and raises safety concerns, among other problems not captured by the concept of energy sprawl.
45
Id.
46
See id. (“U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s recent efforts to permit some renewable
energy development in appropriate places after thorough environmental review . . . show that energy
sprawl is a challenge that can be overcome through proper management.”).
43
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III. MICROGRIDS
Some people believe that we must choose between large facilities that
generate alternative energy but destroy the environment, or the status
quo.47 If that were the case, the problem of energy sprawl would seem
insurmountable. A third option, however, exists: the alternative energy
microgrid, which deploys distributed generation technologies on a small
scale. Although the concept of the microgrid has been used in engineering
circles for a decade, it is relatively new in legal academia, so it warrants
further explanation.48 After clarifying the concept, this Part explains why
the microgrid—and alternative energy microgrids, in particular—can help
reduce the spread of energy sprawl.
A. The Definition
To understand the microgrid, one must first understand the concept of
distributed generation. Distributed generation, also known as on-site
generation or distributed energy, refers to the production of electricity by a
small-scale source located at or very near the end users it serves.49 Energy
production thus occurs in distributed, or decentralized locations, rather
than at one central point. A distributed generation system often contains
generating equipment, controls for fluctuations in loads, storage devices,
and monitoring equipment.50 Distributed generation may either co-exist
with and link to one of the three primary interconnections in this country,51
loosely referred to in this Article as the “grid,” or exist off the grid.
Microgrids organize distributed generation technology into a closed,
low-voltage system that may address the needs of multiple users using
multiple kinds of technologies.52 A microgrid might, for example, utilize
two kinds of distributed generation—a fuel cell, stored underground, and a
photovoltaic solar array, located on multiple existing roofs—and storage
equipment to serve an entire block of homeowners.53 During the day,
47
See, e.g., Dinnell & Russ, supra note 24, at 538 (presenting these two options in the wind farm
context as a “Hobson’s choice,” though the options really present a false dilemma, since there are more
than two alternatives).
48
The term “microgrid” or “micro-grid” appeared in just sixteen scholarly or professional articles
in the Journal and Law Review database of Westlaw, searched by the author on Oct. 15, 2010. This
Article, however, is not the first to advocate for the use of microgrids. See, e.g., Robert DeLay, Solar
Power & NYC Schools: Good Government and Electric Sparkplug, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 161,
170 n.62, 171 n.76 (2009) (citing the suggestion from the Center for Sustainable Energy at Bronx
Community College to make microgrids legal in New York state).
49
See supra note 5.
50
LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–2.
51
These interconnections are the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the
Texas Interconnection. Within the Eastern and Western Interconnections, multiple regional
transmissions organizations also play an important role.
52
See supra note 6.
53
Experts agree that while no technology is perfect (microturbines and fuel cells, for example, run
on natural gas), such technologies are far cleaner than conventional combustion engines. See, e.g.,
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when the sun shines, the neighbors might use the energy produced by the
photovoltaic array, storing the energy produced by the fuel cell until
nighttime. Meanwhile, excess heat from the fuel cell might be channeled
into a heat recovery system that heats water and/or spaces within the
homes.
Microgrids also present the opportunity for real-time management of
aggregate production and loads. A Dutch company has developed
technologies that allow end users to manage microgrids through an
accessible central control system.54 These products, which include an
energy modem, software, and user interface, help end users (and managers)
manage local energy networks.55 Homes could be connected to this
monitoring system through individual meters, and neighbors could work
out a tariff—that is, a schedule of rates determining the price of energy—
that reflects the cost of installing and maintaining the infrastructure.
Like individual distributed generation facilities, microgrids could
either tie to the grid or exist apart from it. If interconnected with the grid,
microgrids could connect as a “single self-controlled entity,” like any other
end user.56 As day-to-day needs fluctuate, grid-connected microgrids
could either draw power from the central grid or sell excess power to the
local utility under applicable state net metering rules. In systemic
emergencies, the microgrid could be disconnected from the central grid
altogether, both protecting energy needs of the users of the microgrid and
protecting the central grid from unexpected electrical surges.
Potential users of microgrids must review many variables to determine
the best design of the microgrid from the outset.57 Flexibility to respond
over time to changes in demand and other circumstances, however, is also
important. Ideally, a microgrid would function as a peer-to-peer system—
a system without a critical master controller essential to its operation. It
would also be a plug-and-play system—a system in which a new
technology might be added at any point without undue disruption, like
home appliances are placed in a home.58 With these two characteristics,
LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at preface, 1–3 (representing the premiere nationwide research group
investigating alternative energy microgrids).
54
Products, QURRENT: THE COMMUNITY ENERGY COMPANY, http://www.qurrent.com/eng/
products.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
55
Id.
56
See LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1, 9–10 (describing the concept of the CERTS
MicroGrid, which has such a feature and is now the standard model for microgrid connectivity).
57
See, e.g., Hoff et al., supra note 6 (identifying six variables for determining microgrid
characteristics: customer type, number of customers, types of distributed generation technologies,
generation unit size, number of generation units, and level of system reliability). Of course, the
availability of favorable financing through incentives, rebates, loan programs, renewable energy
credits, net metering, and other means would also dictate the scale of the project.
58
See R.H. Lasseter, Microgrids and Distributed Generation, 133 J. ENERGY ENG’G 144, 146–47
(2007) [hereinafter Lasseter, Distributed Generation] (explaining the peer-to-peer concept of
micogrids).
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microgrids can respond quickly and efficiently to user needs.
Researchers across the country have ensured that the system described
above, and variations thereof, is feasible from a technical standpoint.59 For
at least a decade, the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology
Solutions (“CERTS”) has taken the lead on research on the optimization of
microgrid performance. CERTS includes four national research labs, nine
universities, and eight industry groups,60 which aim to transform the
electric grid into something more reliable, responsive, and transparent.61
Research from CERTS participants and others has revealed that microgrids
stand ready to be deployed.
B. Why Microgrids?
With this understanding of microgrids, their prospective role in
mitigating energy sprawl becomes clear. Microgrids can provide energy in
real time to small groups of end users from a location in and around
existing development. They are flexible and adaptable, and match the
scale of demand, which for three-quarters of the users in this country is
exceptionally small.62
Microgrids present a compelling alternative to the current mode of
generating power in the United States, which primarily occurs through a
network of large-scale centralized facilities. Microgrids reduce energy
sprawl because they increase capacity without relying on massive, landintensive transmission lines that large-scale facilities need to transport
power to customers.63 Nor do they usually require new parallel
infrastructure for other utilities—such as water for solar panels, or natural
gas for fuel cells and microturbines—because they are typically located in
59
See Publications, CONSORTIUM FOR ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS,
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-pubs.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing eighteen technical publications
on microgrids alone); see also Hassan Nikkhajoei & Robert H. Lasseter, Distributed Generation
Interface to the CERTS Microgrid, 24 I.E.E.E. TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 1598, 1598
(2009) (articulating a framework by which the resources of a distributed generation system can be
channeled into special kind of microgrid, the CERTS MicroGrid, which can be separated and
reconnected from the central grid seamlessly).
60
Research Performers, CONSORTIUM FOR ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS,
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-org-rp.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Pacific
Northwest, and Sandia among the national labs, as well as listing the universities and industry groups
involved).
61
See
Vision,
CONSORTIUM
FOR
ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY
TECH.
SOLUTIONS,
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-vision.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (expressing a fourfold vision, including
the transformation of the electric grid into an intelligent network; the enhancement of reliability
management through market mechanisms; the empowerment of customers to manage their energy use;
and the seamless integration of distributed technologies).
62
See AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
MAKING ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE 2 (2009) (noting that “[t]hree-fourths of U.S.
residential and commercial customers use electricity at an average rate that does not exceed 1.5 and 12
kilowatts respectively, whereas a single conventional power plant produces about a million kilowatts”).
63
See RAWSON, supra note 5, at 6 (indicating the “value of reducing ‘foot-print’ or space needed
by generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure” as a benefit of distributed generation).
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areas already served by such utilities. Such areas include central cities,
which many argue could greatly benefit from a concentration of so-called
“green jobs” related to the proliferation of renewable technology.64 If
effectively deployed across the country, microgrids could reduce demand
on the grid itself, which would reduce the need for additional transmission
and distribution capacity, and thereby reduce the amount of land and
habitat occupied or affected by energy infrastructure.
Significant up-front outlays of capital for physical infrastructure are
not the only expense of a large facility. Currently, approximately one-third
to one-half of consumers’ electric bills go toward the maintenance of
existing large-scale infrastructure.65 In addition, sunk costs cannot be
recovered if populations shift; our existing energy infrastructure is
extremely difficult to move or modify. Microgrids that incorporate plugand-play technology provide great flexibility for users, who can move
equipment and modify systems as circumstances require.66 As Amory
Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute has argued, while utilities have
focused “on a few genuine economies of scale (the bigger, the less
investment per kW),” they have “overlooked larger diseconomies of scale
in the power stations, the grid, the way both are run, and the architecture of
the entire system.”67
Microgrids present an opportunity to re-configure these
“diseconomies” of scale and make the country’s overall energy
infrastructure more reliable and efficient. Currently, electric power
interruptions—including noise, distortions, high voltage spikes, and
instable frequencies—cost industrial, commercial, and residential
consumers eighty billion dollars annually.68 Disruptions to the grid can
have a domino effect, with the Department of Energy warning of “a
64

See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1153
(2009) (arguing persuasively that inner cities could benefit from “the integrated environmental and
economic opportunities presented by new green-collar jobs”).
65
THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 18.
66
See supra text accompanying note 58.
67
See LOVINS ET AL., supra note 62 (documenting two hundred benefits of distributed
generation).
68
KRISTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE & JOSEPH H. ETO, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB., UNDERSTANDING THE COST OF POWER INTERRUPTIONS TO U.S. ELECTRICITY
CONSUMERS xi (2004), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/55718.pdf; see also R. BRENT ALDERFER ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY DISTRIBUTED POWER PROGRAM, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
MAKING CONNECTIONS: CASE STUDIES OF INTERCONNECTION BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
DISTRIBUTED POWER PROJECTS 1 (2000), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy00osti/28053.pdf
(arguing that distributed generation could improve reliability and save consumers billions of dollars
annually); ROBERT GALVIN ET AL., PERFECT POWER: HOW THE MICROGRID REVOLUTION WILL
UNLEASH CLEANER, GREENER, AND MORE ABUNDANT ENERGY 15–18 (2009) (describing the
inefficiencies of the numerous regional power failures from 2006 to 2008); THE SMART GRID, supra
note 4, at 8 (noting that the 2003 blackout in the northeast resulted in a six billion dollar economic loss,
while a one-hour outage at the Chicago Board of Trade in 2002 resulted in twenty trillion dollars in
delayed trades).
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cascading series of failures that could bring our nation’s banking,
communications, traffic, and security systems among others to a complete
Decentralization of power sources provides greater
standstill.”69
reliability, because if one power source goes down, other power sources
can remain fully functional.70 For these reasons, decentralization via the
microgrid could help address concerns of terrorist attacks on American
energy infrastructure. Decentralized microgrids can serve very remote
sites, where development is necessary. Finally, microgrids could help with
transmission congestion issues prevalent in urban areas, particularly in the
northeast, which in turn could drive down energy costs for consumers.
Microgrids also provide a financially and operationally efficient
alternative to individual distributed generation. Studies have shown that
microgrids can save users twenty to twenty-five percent in energy costs
over the cost of individual distributed generation.71 Individual distributed
generation can be very expensive for individual users and may be difficult
to finance because of its small scale.72 Larger-scale microgrids, however,
may be easier to finance and, as discussed elsewhere, spread risk and costs
among multiple users.
From an operational standpoint, with individual distributed generation,
a single user must rely on a single technology to meet all energy needs.
With microgrids, a variety of configurations and sources enables different
energy needs to be met at different times by different equipment.73 Wind
or solar power, which can be used when the weather conditions allow,
could be combined with steady-stream energy generators, such as
geothermal wells, to meet varying demands.74 In microgrids that serve
multiple users, users’ different needs at different times of the day help to
smooth out demand. In other words, there are fewer spikes and troughs in
use than in a system with one user; with fewer fluctuations in demand, the
microgrid’s power can be more steadily utilized.
Moreover, microgrids can use waste heat more efficiently than
69

THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 9.
See Lasseter, Distributed Generation, supra note 58, at 146.
71
King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 47 tbl.19 (analyzing system net present value savings from
distributed generation and microgrids for hospital, office, mall, “urban mix,” and other users).
72
But see Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming
Mar.–Apr. 2011) (describing the creation of energy financing districts in cities in California, Colorado,
and New York, which use local government powers, such as tax overlay districts, to help private parties
finance renewable energy).
73
Lasseter, Distributed Generation, supra note 58, at 144 (“Indiscriminant application of
individual distributed generators can cause as many problems as it may solve. A better way to realize
the emerging potential of distributed generation is to take a system approach which views generation
and associated loads as a subsystem or a ‘microgrid.’”).
74
Note that it may be especially important to ensure that fuel cells are paired with a technology
that can help smooth demand. Because fuel cells produce a steady stream of energy, they must be built
to the peak capacity. If connected to a grid, fuel cells feed electricity into the grid in off-peak hours
and pull from the grid during peak hours. Managing fuel cell input and output is an important
consideration in microgrid situations.
70
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individual distributed generation systems can, because one technology that
produces waste heat can be combined with another technology that
captures it.75 This phenomenon, called cogeneration or combined heat and
power, improves dramatically on traditional, centralized systems, because
the production of heat is closer to the point of use and because heat
production can be better matched to heat demand.76 In traditional,
centralized systems, half to three-quarters of such heat dissipates without
being used, because energy production usually occurs very far away from
end users.77 Using heat at the site of its creation can more than double the
overall efficiencies of the microgrid,78 adding yet another benefit of
microgrids over our current method of siting and utilizing energy
infrastructure.
Lower infrastructure costs, flexible configurations, and the ability to
use waste heat result in big savings to microgrid users. It may be
important to conclude this section with some thoughts about the feasibility
of small-scale energy sharing among neighbors. Some may doubt the
ability of neighbors to cooperate enough to conceive, execute, and
maintain something as complicated as a microgrid. Reviewing the
American experience with district energy systems may assuage these
doubts. District energy systems are small-scale systems that offer
institutions, groups of individuals, or certain economies of scale to heat
and/or cool several buildings at once through a small- or mid-sized
facility.79 Note that heating and cooling are not as regulated as electricity
and other energy production.80 As one example of a successful district
energy system, a condominium community in New Hampshire uses a
central pellet boiler plant which uses locally produced biomass fuel for
heat and hot water.81 The twenty-nine units range in size, and some are

75
See King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that “the development and adoption of
interconnected micro-grids with combined heat-and-power applications” are the only way for
microgrids to reach their full potential).
76
See LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
77
See id. at 4.
78
See Robert H. Lasseter & Paolo Piagi, Microgrid: A Conceptual Solution, June 2004, available
at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/mg-pesc04.pdf (stating that “[t]he size of emerging generation technologies
permits generators to be placed optimally in relation to heat loads” and that the small scale of heat
production “offers greater flexibility in matching to heat requirements”).
79
Ideally, the users of district energy, like the users of future microgrids, have different energy
needs that vary throughout the day, a circumstance that flattens demand. An institution like a
university, with different use profiles for different spaces, such as dormitories, laboratories, classrooms,
auditoriums, and gyms, can take full advantage of a district energy system.
80
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 757.005(1)(a)(E)–(F) (2009) (exempting from public utility
regulation “[a]ny person furnishing heat, but not delivering electricity or natural gas to its customers”
and entities “furnishing heat to a single thermal end user from an electric generating facility, plant or
equipment that is physically interconnected with the single thermal end user”).
81
Green Features, NUBANUSIT NEIGHBORHOOD & FARM, http://www.peterborough
cohousing.org/green_features.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
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freestanding buildings. The central plant has helped the community to
obtain the highest rank in the widely-recognized certification system
administered by the U.S. Green Building Council.83 Concerns about the
safety, utility, or effectiveness of district energy systems, which like
microgrids serve multiple distinct physical spaces, have been greatly
reduced as such systems have become more common.
Moreover, various groups around the country are building networks
that rely on the mutual support of neighbors to achieve alternative energy
goals. In the nation’s capitol, for example, several solar cooperatives have
been established to share information, ideas, and labor.84 In Maryland, a
chamber of commerce has worked with a local clean energy broker to
negotiate bulk rates for the purchase of wind power.85 In New Hampshire,
neighbors install alternative energy equipment for neighbors, in “energy
rais[ing]” events not unlike the barn raising events of yesteryear.86 These
efforts reveal a growing grassroots initiative among neighbors to mobilize
for alternative energy. The time to capitalize on this movement by
facilitating the proliferation of microgrids is now.
IV. THWARTING MICROGRIDS, FACILITATING SPRAWL
Despite their possible benefits, only a few microgrid projects have
been attempted in this country, mostly as prototypes or demonstrations.87
Many regulatory, political, and economic barriers hinder the creation of
microgrids and thus facilitate energy sprawl. Although an exhaustive
treatment of these barriers goes beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
survey reveals why the reforms described in Part V are so necessary.
82

Id. (describing the homes as having an energy efficient design).
Id. (describing the platinum certification obtained through the LEED program).
See, e.g., About, MOUNT PLEASANT SOLAR COOPERATIVE, http://www.mtpleasant
solarcoop.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the network of seventy-plus
households that negotiate bulk purchase discounts and exchange information); Our Plans, COMMON
CENTS SOLAR COOP., http://www.commoncentssolar.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (citing
its mission not only to educate potential solar users but also to make the cost of solar cheaper through
collective bargaining); Solar Roof Project, CAPITOL HILL ENERGY COOPERATIVE,
http://sites.google.com/site/capitolhillenergycoop/solarroofproject (last visited Oct. 26, 2010)
(describing the process by which D.C. property owners can install solar panels on their homes and
indicating that over one hundred individuals were participating in the information exchange).
85
Rockville Chamber of Commerce Teams up with Clean Currents for First Ever Green Energy
Buying Group, CLEAN CURRENTS, (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.cleancurrents.com/index.php/
Rockville-Chamber-of-Commerce-Teams-up-with-Clean-Currents-for-First-Ever-Green-EnergyBuying-Group (announcing the partnership which creates a green power buying group).
86
The Plymouth Area Renewable Energy Initiative (“PAREI”), for example, has convened at
least one hundred and fifty “energy rais[ing]” events to help individuals reduce the cost of solar
installation. See Sarah Schweitzer, Many Hands Make Light Work of Saving Energy; Neighbors
Gather to Install Solar Power, BOS. GLOBE, May 8, 2008, at A1 (describing PAREI’s efforts on a
house in Sandwich, New Hampshire); Energy Raisers, PLYMOUTH AREA RENEWABLE ENERGY
INITIATIVE, http://www.plymouthenergy.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
87
See supra note 7.
83
84
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A. Regulatory Barriers
By far the biggest barrier to the creation of microgrids is contradictory,
unclear, or hostile law. State legislatures and state public utility
commissions have made it difficult to determine whether a microgrid
project can be built. One critical question is whether a microgrid should be
considered a public utility. State laws often define “public utility” to
include any person or entity furnishing power to another, without regard to
the number of recipients of such power and without exceptions for
alternative energy or microgrids.88 Such broad definitions would subject
even a microgrid with two users to burdensome regulation, because public
utilities must abide by very strict rules that determine allowable
technologies, tariffs, technical requirements, and other parameters.
No state laws squarely address microgrids, and no comprehensive,
publicly-available analysis of possible means to allow microgrids within
current state law appears to exist. Two studies, however, have shed some
light on current law and regulators’ perceptions. In 2002, researchers at
Carnegie Mellon University interviewed utility regulators in eight states to
determine how their states treated microgrids.89 They presented the
regulators with several scenarios, including one in which a for-profit
commercial firm served twenty customers in an industrial park, as well as a
cooperative operated by its customers.90 Of the eight regulators, three
indicated that microgrids in at least one presented scenario could be built,
but only one of the three, the representative from Minnesota, indicated that
small microgrids might be exempt from public utility classification and
regulation.91 None of the other states had an exemption for small numbers
of customers.92 Similar findings were obtained by a Carnegie Mellon Ph.D
candidate in 2006. He surveyed twenty-seven state public utility
commissions, asking each whether a microgrid is legal. Of those,
seventeen said that the microgrid was “probably” or “definitely” legal, but

88
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-129 (2002) (defining “public utility” to mean “every common
carrier, pipe line corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, water
corporation, and wharfinger”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-104(a) (2002) (defining “public utility” to mean
“every corporation, company, individual, association of persons, their trustees, lessees or receivers, that
now or hereafter may own, control, operate or manage, except for private use, any equipment, plant or
generating machinery, or any part thereof”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.020(2)(a) (2009) (defining “public
utility” to include “[a]ny plant or equipment, or any part of a plant or equipment, within this State for
the production, delivery or furnishing for or to other persons, including private or municipal
corporations, heat, gas, coal slurry, light, power in any form”).
89
M. Granger Morgan & Hisham Zerriffi, The Regulatory Environment for Small Independent
Micro-Grid Companies, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2002, at 52, 53 (noting that some of the eight
representatives were current regulators, and some were former regulators).
90
Id. at 53–54.
91
Id. at 53.
92
Id. at 54.
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only under very specific circumstances.
In addition to muddling the creation of microgrids, state laws also fail
to specify how microgrids might be regulated.94 The 2002 survey
mentioned above, for example, included questions related to
interconnection with the central grids. The answers reflected at best,
confusion, and at worst, obstruction by utilities, public utility commissions,
and state legislatures.95 The 2006 study showed that only four states of the
twenty-seven surveyed had laws for individual distributed generation,
tariffs, and interconnection procedures which could apply to microgrids.96
While both studies are several years old and had small sample sizes, the
findings reflect current concerns across jurisdictions. More broadly,
ambiguities in the law create fundamental uncertainties about the legality
and treatment of microgrids, dampening investment even where microgrids
might, with creative lawyering, be possible.97
A few states have passed laws that could open the door for the creation
and operation of microgrids. Oregon, for example, defines “public utility”
as an entity “that owns, operates, manages or controls all or a part of any
plant or equipment in this state for the production, transmission, delivery
or furnishing of heat, light, water or power, directly or indirectly to or for
the public.”98 It excludes from public utility regulation any entity or person
that provides heat, light, or power from: any energy resource to fewer than
twenty residential customers; solar or wind resources to any number of
customers; or biogas, waste heat or geothermal resources for nonelectric
generation purposes to any number of customers.99 This definition implies
that microgrids with fewer than twenty customers may be legal, although
no legislation specifically provides for their implementation. Across the
country, meanwhile, Connecticut has authorized municipalities to create
energy improvement districts that can own and operate distributed
generation technologies and combined heat and power, have multiple
customers, and charge customers fees for their energy use.100 The
93
See Douglas E. King, The Regulatory Environment for Interconnected Electric Power MicroGrids: Insights from State Regulatory Officials 1 (Dep’t of Eng’g and Pub. Policy, Carnegie Mellon
Univ., Working Paper CEIC-05-08, 2008) [hereinafter King, Regulatory Environment], available at
https://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs/CEIC_05_08.pdf.
94
See id. (“No states have clear guidance for the regulatory oversight of micro-grid systems once
they are installed, and most respondents indicated that such oversight would be conducted on a caseby-case basis.”).
95
Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 54 (stating that “[n]one of the eight respondents gave a
simple yes” as to whether terms and conditions would be “clear and predictable”).
96
See King, Regulatory Environment, supra note 93, at 1.
97
Id. at 6.
98
OR. REV. STAT. § 757.005(1)(a)(A) (2009).
99
Id. § 757.005(1)(a)(C).
100
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-80a(a)(1) (2009) (defining “energy improvement district
distributed resources”); id. § 32-80a(c) (allowing an energy improvement district to, among other
things, “[f]ix [and collect] fees, rates, rentals or other charges for the purpose of all energy
improvement district distributed resources owned by the energy improvement district board” and
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Connecticut statute provides that such districts are neither electric
distribution companies—a kind of public utility in the state—nor
municipal electric utilities.101 While the law on municipality-controlled
energy improvement boards does not provide a similar capacity for private
firms, it still represents a move in the right direction. That said, without
comprehensive statutes fully describing the treatment of microgrids,
removing barriers created by legal uncertainties is very unlikely.
B. Political Barriers
Any attempts to reform the law to facilitate microgrids will have to
overcome objections from two politically active groups: utility companies
and neighbors. This subsection outlines the impact of these groups on
current laws and policies.
1. Utility Companies
Utility companies, which tend to object to distributed generation—and,
by extension, microgrids—have a significant impact on state law and on
the financial feasibility of distributed generation projects. The utilities
fight to protect their monopolies over service areas granted by the federal
and state governments.102 The Department of Energy described this
protective impulse and identified utility companies as major impediments
to regulatory reform for distributed generation.103 Although utilities view
any customer generation as potentially detrimental, their opposition to
microgrids is far greater than their opposition to individual distributed
generation, because microgrids involve exchanges of power and payment
between multiple users.104 Such exchanges could infringe on the
monopolies enjoyed by utility companies, and so are vigorously
opposed.105 Microgrids may impose other costs on utilities, such as: an
increase in the per-user share of capital costs for infrastructure
maintenance; the need to provide standby power over normal capacity;
“[o]perate and maintain all energy improvement district distributed resources owned or leased by the
board and use the revenues from such resources for the corporate purposes of the board”).
101
Id. § 32-80a(d)(1)–(2).
102
Only in rare instances are service areas open to competition. See King, Regulatory
Environment, supra note 93, at 6.
103
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at iv (observing that “regulatory incentives drive the
distribution utility to defend the monopoly against market entry by distributed power technologies” and
that barriers faced by distributed generation “grow out of long-standing regulatory policies and
incentives designed to support monopoly supply and average system costs for all ratepayers”).
104
King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 3 (“Unlike conventional DER applications, micro-grids pose a
perceived market threat to regulated electric utilities because electric power is exchanged from one
customer to another within the micro-grid—a service that is currently restricted only to regulated
utilities.”); see also id. at 83 (“Electric utilities have historically viewed customer-generators—those
who have their own on-site generation—as financial, technical, and safety risks.”).
105
See Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 1, 5 (interviewing eight state public utility
commissioners, all of whom indicated that utilities would oppose microgrid legislation vigorously).
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system upgrades; the cost of safety and maintenance issues related to
interconnection of the microgrids; and the cost of uncertainties in planning
for infrastructure expansion or modification.106 If microgrids create too
much uncertainty, a utility company may refrain from either entering into
long term contracts for power or investing in long-term capital upgrades.
Ultimately, utilities argue, these costs would be passed on to the consumer.
One way utilities slow adoption of distributed generation laws is by
raising false concerns about technical feasibility and safety. For example,
they often claim that distributed generation will supply power to the utilityrun central grid when the grid is down, causing fires or endangering
workers who believe they are fixing de-energized lines.107 While these
fears may have once been reasonable, technology to prevent this effect,
known as “islanding,” exists and has been used successfully for over two
decades.108 In addition, national safety standards, most prominently a
standard issued by a well-respected international electrical engineering
association, have been developed for the interconnection of distributed
generation to the central grid.109 The majority of the states have begun to
adopt model safety standards,110 although such adoption has not resulted in
a clear legal framework for microgrids. Utility companies have also
argued that distributed generation equipment threatens power quality.111
Here, too, new technologies have emerged that protect against negative
effects on power quality.112 Other technological issues have been carefully
analyzed and resolved by CERTS and other research and industry
groups.113
By raising unfounded concerns through public hearings, lobbying, and
other activities, utility companies worry lawmakers already confused about
the technical aspects of distributed generation. This impact is particularly
significant because utilities are often the most prominent group involved in
drafting energy rules at the state level. Nonprofits, individually affected
parties, and manufacturers of distributed generation and microgrid
106
Douglas King & M. Granger Morgan, Guidance for Drafting State Legislation to Facilitate the
Growth of Independent Electric Power Micro-Grids 2 (Carnegie Mellon Elec. Indus. Ctr., Working
Paper CEIC-03-17, 2003), available at https://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs/CEIC_03_17.pdf.
107
See ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 9; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 29–30.
108
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 9; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 30–32.
109
See, e.g., INST. OF ELEC. & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS, STANDARD 1547, IEEE STANDARD FOR
INTERCONNECTING DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES WITH ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS (2003).
110
See VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 19 (indicating that thirty-one states had to date
considered or adopted new interconnectivity safety standards).
111
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 10; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 32–34
(“Power quality is important because electronic devices and appliances are designed to receive power
within a designated range of voltage and frequency parameters, and deviations outside those ranges can
cause appliance malfunction or damage.”).
112
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 10.
113
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (reflecting research on voltage, generator
configuration, monitoring equipment, and the like).
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equipment have been active, but as the previous subsection reveals, they
have not proven to be as well-organized, or as effective, in getting their
initiatives passed into law.
Beyond lawmaking, utilities have a profound impact on the financial
feasibility of distributed generation. This impact arises from utilities’
ability to set tariffs and policies on end users within their jurisdiction. The
Department of Energy has documented numerous examples of utilities
charging unfair and outsized backup tariffs—supplemental, backup, and
standby tariffs that distributed generators are required to pay to ensure
access to the grid.114 Sometimes, the proposed tariffs have even exceeded
the equivalent cost of the energy produced by the distributed generator.115
In addition, utilities, which enjoy monopolies over buying back excess
energy, have tended to offer very low buyback rates.116 Low buyback rates
mean that power produced during off-peak periods which is not used by
the microgrid cannot necessarily be fed back into the central grid, and sold
back to the utility, at rates that would help offset the costs of investing in
distributed generation. Finally, utilities sometimes refuse to serve users of
distributed generation, by refusing to connect them to the grid. Backup
generators that would alleviate worries of being without power—that is,
protect microgrid users in a worst-case scenario—tend to add so many
costs that entire projects are abandoned. The negative impact of these
practices on the financial feasibility of distributed generation, and by
extension microgrids, is clear. If past behavior is any indication, utility
companies will continue to obstruct any reform that would facilitate
microgrids.
2. Neighbors
Neighbors, like utility companies, also have significant influence on
the future of microgrids, although neighbors influence local law and policy
more than state law and policy. More specifically, neighbors have played
and will play a big part in land use issues, which are traditionally local in
nature.
I have written elsewhere about localities’ role in siting alternative
energy technology and will summarize my findings here.117 Of nearly
forty thousand local governments nationwide, less than a hundred have
squarely addressed renewable energy technologies like the ones that could

114

ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 21.
Id. at 23 (describing a utility’s attempt to charge $144,000 annually for a backup tariff for a
facility that would generate just $100,000 worth of electricity annually).
116
Id. at 28 (“[M]ost current siting processes were designed for large power plants, thus posing
barriers to distributed power analogous to those more fully discussed in this report.”).
117
See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation,
and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 235–40 (2008) (describing the locality of land use laws).
115
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be deployed in a microgrid.
Tens of thousands of localities have either
barred or ignored such technologies, in the laws either as written or as
applied.119 Local laws that thwart alternative energy projects include
zoning ordinances, aesthetic controls, and historic preservation rules.120
Examples of local groups using these laws to erect barriers to
alternative energy equipment, particularly with respect to wind energy,
abound.121 For instance, a city in Oklahoma changed its ordinances to
prevent a wind farm from locating there,122 while a New York town
enacted a moratorium on wind turbine towers.123 Even outside of formal
legal actions, neighbors have managed to wrangle informal agreements and
concessions from wind energy generators fearful of formal protests.124
Wind turbines may be taller and bulkier than other alternative energy
generating technologies, but each technology has physical features that
may make its proximity undesirable to potential neighbors: Solar
collectors can be unsightly; microturbines can create a disconcerting hum;
fuel cells are essentially large, trailer-sized boxes that are hardly beautiful;
geothermal wells must be drilled fifteen hundred feet underground with
loud equipment. To be sure, technology is improving, and many old
stereotypes no longer apply. But in too many communities, neighbor
involvement in local decision-making processes can help to kill microgrid
projects that the utilities, and unfavorable state laws, do not. The
equipment that supports microgrids has to go somewhere. If too many
118
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION: 2002
CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS v (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf
(indicating that 38,967 general-purpose local governments exist nationwide); Bronin, supra note 117, at
249–50 (indicating that seventy-five of these governments have squarely addressed green building but
have not provided a separate figure for localities that have addressed alternative energy).
119
See Bronin, supra note 117, at 250–55 (indicating how localities have barred or ignored green
technologies).
120
Id.
121
See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1068–71 (2009) (providing a
detailed account of neighbor opposition to wind energy siting, and arguing that “local opposition to
wind turbines, often labeled NIMBYism, is common” and that “[i]n fact, some communities have
adopted moratoria on siting wind turbines after project developers expressed interest in the areas”
(footnotes omitted)).
122
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 20 (noting that since the wind farm owner in question had
been grandfathered in, the farm could be sited in the town despite zoning ordinances).
123
A prospective wind farm developer sued the town—but lost. See Ecogen, LLC v. Town of
Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 152 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). The moratorium stated that
the installation of wind turbine facilities in the Town of Italy may have an adverse
affect [sic] upon the scenic and aesthetic attributes of the Town of Italy and a
correspondingly detrimental influence upon residential and recreational uses as well
as real estate values in the Town of Italy, unless properly controlled through zoning
regulations.
Id. at 153.
124
See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Bay Area: Wind Turbines Leave Some in a Huff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2010, at A13A (describing various tensions between property owners who install wind turbines and
their neighbors, as well as informal arrangements among neighbors, such as a wind turbine owner’s
agreeing not to operate his turbine on weekends when his neighbor gardens).
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neighbors object and the equipment cannot be located in previously
developed locations, where the infrastructure to support it already exists,
then energy sprawl will continue to spread.
As Parts II and III clarified, the need to facilitate alternative energy
microgrids, and the distributed generation technologies that comprise them,
is clear. In those communities that explicitly bar alternative energy
technologies, concerted efforts must be made to reverse course. In those
communities that ignore alternative energy technologies, ambiguities must
be resolved through careful redrafting of local laws. For a variety of
reasons, however, localities are unlikely to move forward with major
reforms.125 In this limited respect, given the extra-local nature of energy
sprawl, states may have a role in encouraging localities to facilitate
microgrids—without ignoring neighbor objections—through carefully
written state enabling statutes.126
C. Economic Barriers
Uncertainties about the price of surmounting formidable regulations
and the unsubsidized, high costs per user can deter investment in
distributed generation and microgrid projects.127 As noted above, utilities
may set tariffs or engage in selective discount pricing.128 Utilities’ refusal
to establish clear guidelines for microgrid users make basic budgeting, and
predicting returns, extremely difficult. In addition, the relative cost per
user of microgrids to other alternative energy infrastructure is very high.
Microgrid physical infrastructure does not cost as much per unit of energy
as large-scale, centralized facilities, because microgrids do not require
The costs of
extensive transmission and distribution systems.129
microgrids, however, must be borne by a smaller number of users than the
costs of central grid infrastructure. This denominator problem comes into
play when dealing with administrative costs, such as costs related to
environmental permitting and review, which may be the same for few-user
projects as for many-user projects.130 The per-user comparative costs look
125
See Bronin, supra note 117, at 249–50, 255–60 (describing how localities are unable to move
forward with major reforms due to the unpopularity of mandates, minimal efforts to amend existing
laws or create new laws, and the power of interest groups in preventing sustainable-design principles
from being written into local laws).
126
See id. at 266–72 (explaining how states can balance local autonomy and public policy goals
of pursuing alternative energy).
127
See THE CERTS MICROGRID CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 21 (observing that rapidly changing
commodity prices may deter investment in microgrids and stating that “it appears that emerging
restructured electricity markets will deliver volatile commodity electricity prices and an erratic
investment program that results in unpredictable electricity supply reliability”).
128
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 18.
129
Hoff et al., supra note 6, at 2.
130
ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 18. Note that some states are already beginning to reduce
administrative costs for small-scale projects. The New York Public Service Commission, for example,
has decided that utility companies cannot require interconnection studies for facilities that produce
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even worse in light of the lack of public subsidies for microgrids.
Public subsidies for both individual distributed generation and large
alternative energy facilities, on the other hand, run into the billions.
Massive subsidies from all levels of government support individual
distributed generation with one end user.132 These subsidies—grants, tax
credits, property tax exemptions, renewable energy credits, loan
guarantees, and low-interest loans—help individuals offset the up-front
and ongoing costs of installing and operating alternative energy
technologies.133 These subsidies have encouraged many individuals to
embrace single-source distributed generation, although the ability of the
vast majority of Americans to spend the money needed to match the
government subsidies is admittedly limited. Moreover, the receipt of these
subsidies is tied to the on-site consumption of all of the energy produced
by the subsidized technology. So individuals who share energy, like
microgrid operators, become ineligible for the incentive programs that
make alternative energy financially feasible.134 Across-the-board revisions
to subsidy rules are certainly in order.
Government support has also been directed toward projects with many
hundreds or thousands of end users, such as the wind turbine farms in West
Texas or the solar installations in the Mojave Desert —projects that, while
better than traditional forms of energy generation, nonetheless create
undesirable energy sprawl. State and local governments justify efforts to
attract such projects to their jurisdictions not only on environmental
grounds, but also on economic development and job creation grounds. The
public utility lobby has also helped increase financial support for large-

fewer than ten kilowatts. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion No. 99-13, Case No. 94-E-0952, In re
Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, app. B (Dec. 31, 1999). The Texas Public
Utility Commission, meanwhile, allows utilities to require an interconnection study for distributed
generation facilities, but the utility cannot charge the generator if it does not export power to the utility
system or if it is smaller than certain set criteria. Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, § 25.211, Interconnection of
Distributed Generation, Dec. 1, 1999, http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/electric/25.211/
25.211.pdf.
131
But see Press Release, supra note 7 (announcing over ten million dollars in federal government
investment in three projects that appear to be microgrids).
132
Numerous governments, and states in particular, provide a wide variety of subsidies. See, e.g.,
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.27(a) (West 2008) (“A person is entitled to an exemption from taxation of
the amount of appraised value of his property that arises from the installation or construction of a solar
or wind-powered energy device that is primarily for production and distribution of energy for on-site
use.”).
133
See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43–44 (2006)
(arguing that the United States should have tax incentives for alternative energy, just as it does for
conventional energy).
134
King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 2–3 (“In order to be cost-effective, continuous-use applications
require the DER customer to be interconnected with the utility grid so that the customer can sell excess
power to the utility and purchase power from the utility during peak periods or on-site system
failures.”).
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scale projects that they control and operate.
As these projects are being
built, however, costs are being shifted to ratepayers and the general public.
For one thing, large projects create energy sprawl, which itself imposes
hidden costs. For another, more strain is placed on the existing grid.
Experts suggest that modernizing the grid could cost up to one hundred
billion dollars, a cost which will be borne by consumers—in other words,
internalized by those given few options to opt out.136 It makes a lot of
sense to dedicate some of that investment to the financial support of
microgrids, which would result in reduced demand on the centralized grid
and reduced transmission and distribution costs.
Expanding public support would, of course, make microgrid projects
more affordable to end users. Perhaps more importantly, it would make
microgrids more attractive to third party investors, who, along with the
utility companies, are important players in large renewable energy projects.
Such investors would be attracted to a microgrid project if the project
received direct public support to offset costs, tax credits which could be
sold to the investor at a discount, and/or renewable energy credits or
energy efficiency certificates which are growing increasingly valuable. A
further articulation of public subsidies for microgrids would be in order,
once the law sufficiently addresses their creation. For the purposes of this
Article, however, political and economic concerns may be treated only
briefly. Turning now to Part V, we return to the law, and three ideas for
resolving some of the regulatory barriers described in Part IV.
V. THWARTING SPRAWL, FACILITATING MICROGRIDS
Slowing the spread of energy sprawl could be achieved in many
ways.137 The most effective option would be reducing consumption, which
seems unlikely given Americans’ unending appetite for energy.138 Other
135
Kamenetz, supra note 29 (“Big utilities are pushing hard to do what they do best—getting the
government to subsidize construction of multi-billion-dollar, far-flung, supersize solar and wind farms
covering millions of acres, all connected via outside transmission lines.”).
136
LACOMMARE & ETO, supra note 68, at xi–ii.
137
The Nature Conservancy recommends four ways to reduce energy sprawl: first, reducing the
area impacted by new energy development (a recommendation that seems circular); second,
encouraging end-use generation; third, making any cap and trade bills flexible enough to include offsets
from carbon capture and storage; and fourth, engaging in site selection and planning efforts to mitigate
impact. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. The author of the report added in an interview that
conservationists could advocate to maximize energy conservation and energy efficiency; build
incentives for the use of abandoned or degraded land, rather than natural habitat; and site new energy
projects away from sensitive species. Palmquist, supra note 3.
138
Some scholars, like Alice Kaswan, argue that U.S. policy must address consumption, and that
“the public’s increasing recognition of the global peril posed by climate change could shift the political
landscape and increase the political feasibility of consumption-reducing policies.” Alice Kaswan,
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 256 (2009). Elsewhere, I have
addressed measures, such as green building mandates, which would curb consumption but remain
skeptical of the possibility of immediate, large-scale reductions. Bronin, supra note 117, at 231.
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extremes—banning new transmission lines or refusing to subsidize any
large-scale extra-urban energy projects—are equally infeasible. In this
situation, modest reforms would work best.
Accordingly, this Article suggests three modest, but potentially very
effective, means of facilitating microgrids, focusing on the primary role the
states play in energy regulation and land use. First, Congress should
require states to consider model standards for microgrid regulation.
Second, states should provide guidance to local governments with respect
to siting microgrid projects. Third, states should develop and authorize
legal institutions that would support microgrid projects, drawing from
Professor Robert Ellickson’s proposal for block improvement
districts.139 If implemented together, these proposals would support
small-scale energy sharing collectives whose emergence could
transform the American landscape.
A. Regulatory Reform: “Considering” Model Standards
State legislatures and agencies must lead reforms for microgrid
regulation. State public utility commissions regulate seventy-five percent
of electricity in this country,140 and they have more expertise with the
creation and operation of distributed generation than other regulatory
bodies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”).141 Although states’ treatment of microgrids to date has been
anything but impressive, there is some hope that they would comply with
federal rules to consider model standards.
In fact, states recently complied with federal mandates to review two
other aspects of distributed generation regulation: net metering and
interconnection standards. The Federal Energy Policy Act of 2005
required state public utility commissions to consider a model
interconnection standard, based on the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Standard 1547,142 as well as to consider a model netmetering standard by 2008.143
139

Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998).
JOSEPH H. ETO & KRISTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., TRACKING THE RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM: AN
ASSESSMENT OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REPORTED TO STATE PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISSIONS 3 (2008), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/lbnl1092e-puc-reliability-data.pdf.
141
FERC does play a role in distributed generation projects. It controls all wholesale electricity
transactions, including distributed generation. And in 2005, FERC adopted interconnection standards
for transmission-level (not distribution-level) interconnections with public utilities (defined under the
federal statute) for projects smaller than twenty megawatts. Standardization of Small Generator
Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,190 (June 13, 2005),
111 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs ¶ 61,220 (2005).
142
The full name of the standard is the Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with
Electric Power Systems. INST. OF ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS, supra note 109, at 1.
143
16 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2006).
140
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Congress passed this law after it recognized the need for
implementation of technical standards with at least some common
elements across jurisdictions, to spur distributed generation. Ten years
ago, the Department of Energy blamed lags in the development of
distributed generation on the lack of “a national consensus on technical
standards for connecting equipment, necessary insurance, reasonable
charges for activities related to connection, or agreement on appropriate
charges or payments for distributed generation.”144 Also in 2000, the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory called the “patchwork of rules and
regulations which defeat the economies of mass production that are natural
to these small modular technologies” the biggest barrier to distributed
generation.145 Ideally, as the Department of Energy and National
Renewable Energy Laboratory recognized, manufacturers of distributed
generation technology need national standards, lest they have to
manufacture fifty different technologies to accommodate state preferences.
The Federal Energy Policy Act requirements appear to have succeeded
in abating these concerns and prompting states to review, modify, and
standardize their policies on interconnectivity and net metering. The states
based their reviews in part on third-party model rules, perhaps most
notably those drafted by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council.146 The
Interstate Renewable Energy Council is a nongovernmental, nonprofit
organization that aims “to remove barriers to renewable energy use.”147
Interestingly, the net metering model rules require that the distributed
generation system must meet, and not exceed, the generator’s on-site
demand, meaning that to take advantage of net metering, the generator
must not serve neighbors; in other words, microgrids are banned.148 Other
model rules on interconnection standards have also formed the foundation
for states’ efforts. These include California’s Rule 21 interconnection
standard, adopted in 2000; FERC’s Small Generator Interconnection
Procedures, issued via Order No. 2006 in 2005; and the Mid-Atlantic
Demand Resource Initiative Procedures.149
During the period of review provided by Congress, thirty-one states
144

ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 34.
Id. at iv, 21–23.
146
See INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, MODEL INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES
(2009), available at http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/IREC-Interconnection-Procedures2010final.pdf; INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, NET METERING MODEL RULES (2009)
available at http://www.irecusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ConnectDocs/IREC_NM_Model_October_
2009-1.pdf.
147
About IREC, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, http://irecusa.org/about-irec/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2010).
148
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, NET METERING MODEL RULES, supra note 146,
at 4 n.3.
149
See VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 20–21 (describing the history of each of these
rules).
145
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adopted or amended their interconnection standards.
Forty-two states
have adopted net metering standards that allow distributed generators to
sell excess energy back to the grid.151 These rules vary among states,
based on the types of technologies, system size, system capacity, timing of
payments, and the ownership of renewable energy credits.152 But we are
no doubt better off today than we would have been without the
“consideration” requirement of the Federal Energy Policy Act. Moreover,
the variety reflects our federalist structure, as states have been allowed to
experiment with different reforms.153 States can continue to experiment,
without federal interference, provided that they have considered the larger
context for their decisions.
Finally, states (and public utilities) may be eager to consider
microgrids once they understand how microgrids can help them meet their
renewable portfolio standard goals.154 Renewable portfolio standards,155
adopted by state legislatures, require public utilities to incorporate a certain
percentage of alternative energy in their productive capacity, within a
certain time period. Not all states have adopted renewable portfolio
standards, and those that do vary widely. Seventeen out of thirty states
with renewable portfolio standards have targets of twenty percent or more,
with each state assuming different benchmark and target years.156 The
most ambitious states are Hawaii and Maine, which have targeted forty
percent of retail energy sales to come from renewables by 2030 and 2017,
respectively.157 Sixteen states have specific provisions setting goals for
solar or distributed generation, the definition of which varies by state, in
150
See id. at 19 (noting, however, that it is hard to say that these changes necessarily resulted
from the Federal Energy Policy Act and that “[a] number of these states may have simply recognized
the value of distributed generation and would have set about to reform state policies regardless of
encouragement from [the Act]”).
151
Id. at 11.
152
See INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, “CONNECTING TO THE GRID” PROJECT,
STATE INTERCONNECTION STANDARDS FOR DISTRIBUTED GENERATION (2010), http://irecusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/February_2010_IC_Table.doc (presenting a comparison of states’ rules on
interconnection, including limits on system capacity, insurance requirements, eligible renewable
technologies, applicable sectors, and more); INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL,
“CONNECTING TO THE GRID” PROJECT, STATE AND UTILITY NET METERING RULES FOR DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION (2010), http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/February_2010_NM_Table.doc
(presenting a similar comparison).
153
Kate Galbraith, Renewable Energy’s Odd Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at WK3
(observing that states’ experimentation can be helpful and stating, “[i]n the absence of sustained federal
action to support clean energy and fight climate change, Texas and California are serving as important
policy laboratories”).
154
See RAWSON, supra note 5, at 5.
155
For a full discussion of renewable portfolio standards, see generally Lincoln L. Davies, Power
Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010), and related commentary
in Connecticut Law Review, Volume 42, Issue 5.
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their renewable portfolio standard.
Such variation reflects the different
factors—energy policy, economic development, the environment—that
states must consider in enacting reforms.
This Article does not propose model rules that Congress should require
the states to consider, because others, including CERTS researchers and
the Carnegie Mellon researchers mentioned above, have already articulated
potential model legal frameworks.159 Without delving too far into the
details, I believe a model standard should have several components: (1) an
articulation of the state policy promoting alternative energy; (2) a
definition of the term “microgrid” based on the definition in this Article—a
multi-user entity with one or more independent sources of electric power
and generation;160 (3) a limit on the size of unregulated microgrids, with
respect to number of participants and energy output, to prevent overly large
projects from evading public utility status;161 (4) a description of an
application and registration process which would be administered by the
state public utility commissions; and (5) the articulation of certain rights
for microgrid owners, such as the right to net meter, and certain
prohibitions on utility behavior, such as prohibiting them from refusing to
serve microgrid customers.162 In addition, key to any reform is a clear, fair
system of tariffs for microgrid operators and end users.163 A bi-directional
tariff that takes into account the needs and goals of the utility companies
and the microgrid operators should be developed.164
If an acceptable model standard for microgrids emerges, Congress
should adopt a rule that requires states to consider it. Federal legislation of
this nature can both respect states’ autonomy and build on states’ expertise.
More broadly, such legislation would reflect political trends that support
158

Id. at 7.
See, e.g., King & Morgan, supra note 106, at 1 (stating that states should pass legislation
which would allow “development of independent micro-grids”); King, Regulatory Environment, supra
note 94, at 11–13 (recommending specific regulatory changes).
160
See King & Morgan, supra note 106, at 2 (suggesting that state laws include such a definition
for microgrids).
161
A reasonable size limit for an unregulated microgrid could be forty megawatts, which, as
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loads for residential homes are ten to thirty kilowatts, for shopping centers two to eight megawatts, and
for office buildings six to twenty megawatts).
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Utilities have great flexibility in applying tariffs and can relatively easily refuse service or
change rates for operators of distributed generation technology or microgrids. King, Regulatory
Environment, supra note 4, at 7.
163
As another commentator has summarized, public utility tariffs are set (or should be set) with
seven goals in mind: attracting capital for the utility, encouraging efficient management practices,
promoting socially optimal consumer choices (preventing over- or under-consumption), ensuring
fairness to investors, providing a stable and predictable rate level, encouraging efficient management
and use of customer-generated resources, and compensating customers for services rendered to the
utility. King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 87–88.
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See Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 6 (suggesting such a tariff and indicating that the
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the creation of so-called “green jobs” and the move toward energy
independence.
B. Siting Reform: Providing Guidance to Localities
The suggestion that states become more involved in providing
guidance to localities for siting microgrids may seem counterintuitive. On
one hand, microgrids consolidate both generation and distribution in a
finite area, and their most significant impacts are local, which might
suggest local control.
On the other hand, the development and
standardization of renewable energy is a nationally important issue, which
might suggest federal control.
State control, however, is preferable to local control because local
decision-makers may not understand, or may be inclined to ignore, the
impact of their actions on areas outside their jurisdiction. They may reject
microgrid technologies, taking a “not-in-my-backyard” approach that
drives distributed generation projects outward.165 Such rejections would
act to increase, not decrease, energy sprawl. Similarly, state control is
preferable to federal control, because federal control of renewable energy
siting must be reserved for issues with interstate implications. Microgrids
have no such implications, as they can operate on the scale of the block or
neighborhood and do not require interstate transmission lines.
To clear a hurdle for potential microgrid operators, state legislatures
should consider laws that provide special treatment for siting microgrid
projects. State public utility laws, discussed in the previous subsection,
may include provisions on siting, although not all states deal with siting.
Only about thirty states have formal transmission line siting statutes; none
of these directly address microgrids.166 Even where siting statutes exist,
scholars have criticized state legislatures for failing to clarify their siting
authority.167 Such criticism, however, focuses on problems related to the
inability of states to coordinate interstate transmission lines that carry
energy across state boundaries, not the intrastate distribution lines required
by microgrids.
Land use regulation, an area of law in which states provide the
framework within which localities make decisions, should also be used to
advance the microgrid agenda.168 At a minimum, state legislatures should
modify their standard zoning enabling acts, which give localities power to
165

See supra text accompanying notes 119–24.
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See Bronin, supra note 117, at 249–55 (“[S]ome localities . . . fail to include any explicit
reference to green technologies in their land use regulations. Although undoubtedly less problematic
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create and administer land use laws, to say that zoning boards and local
councils may not take any action that would unreasonably burden or halt
microgrid projects, absent a compelling state interest in doing so. A few
states have passed such laws to facilitate the siting of individual solar
collectors, on the theory that localities may not necessarily consider the
states’ broader energy goals when making land use decisions.169
Expanding this protection to microgrid projects more generally, while
allowing localities to impose only reasonable restrictions on such projects,
would be worthwhile.
In addition, states could encourage local land use offices to develop
fast-track permitting processes and special building codes for projects that
utilize specific distributed generation technologies. Here too, state
regulation could be implemented in such a way that local autonomy is
respected—for example, providing incentives for localities who revise
their laws. Finally, states could require localities to include microgrid
siting as a mandatory element of their comprehensive plans. Many states
require localities to draft comprehensive plans that take into account
considerations such as affordable housing or open space. It would be
entirely appropriate to ask them to take microgrids into consideration when
devising land use plans for their communities.
Localities may object to any intrusion by the state into their ability to
site renewable energy projects. As Professor David Barron has written,
however, localities do not and cannot enjoy full legal autonomy; rather, the
state both grants and limits their powers.170 In his article Reclaiming Home
Rule, Barron persuasively argues for a break from the outdated notion that
“home rule” requires complete local control. Siting this theoretical
argument in the real-world example of urban sprawl, he argues that
existing state laws that limit and grant localities’ power facilitate sprawl.171
Barron suggests that states could engage localities in the fight against
sprawl by freeing localities to enact creative regulations, such as
inclusionary zoning or antidiscrimination laws, changing annexation rules
to favor city-suburb bargaining, and prohibiting localities from adopting
exclusionary zoning measures.172 Reconfiguring local power in the way
that Barron suggests could be very helpful in reducing energy sprawl,
which like urban sprawl is an extra-local problem.
169
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Just as localities might reject state involvement in microgrid siting,
federal officials may view state involvement as unwarranted or infeasible.
In their article Local Energy, Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman
address the issue of siting renewable energy.173 They advocate for “the
federal government [to] first establish some . . . minimum standard—most
likely a simple prohibition on regulations that impede renewables siting—
for fostering the adoption of distributed renewable energy technologies and
allocate primary authority for implementation and regulation, with
substantial discretion, to local governments.”174 They then argue that state
control on localities regarding renewable siting be altogether preempted by
the federal government.175 The authors contend that establishing a direct
connection between federal and local governments is consistent with the
theoretical underpinnings of federalism and, from a practical standpoint,
can facilitate the spread of renewable energy more easily than action by
states.176 Another pair of scholars writing about wind energy, Patricia
Salkin and Ashira Ostrow, take a similar approach, arguing that Congress
should preempt certain state and local rules and offer a federal wind siting
policy that constrains the ability of localities to make individualized zoning
decisions.177 These scholars’ views may stem from the opinion that state
political obstacles might be difficult to overcome. Eroding states’ power to
regulate siting of small-scale energy installations via federal preemption
could hinder the ability of states to address other aspects of this important
problem.
C. New Legal Institutions
Assuming that the first two reforms suggested by this Article are
adopted by Congress and the states respectively, new legal institutions will
be needed to facilitate the administration of microgrids. This Article
proposes that states authorize the creation of block-level energy districts
(BEDs) based on the block-level improvement districts (BLIDs) imagined
by Professor Robert Ellickson.178 Such districts are not currently
authorized, at least explicitly, by any state.
Ellickson argues that BLIDs—micro-institutions that property owners
in existing neighborhoods can vote to create and administer—could bring
order to the inner city.179 In his view, property owners should be able to
organize into BLIDs that can levy assessments to pay for specific
173
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projects. BLIDs, like the residential community associations common in
new subdivision developments, could provide certain goods and services to
small groups of people with common interests.181 Such goods and services
could include “maintaining sidewalk planters and tot-lots, removing litter
and abandoned vehicles, conducting block-watch programs, and providing
other highly localized benefits.”182 George Liebmann, who arguably began
the discussion about formal block associations in the legal literature,
believed that block-level districts could deal with matters ranging from day
care to law enforcement to traffic regulation to elementary schools.183
Others have considered their potential impact on environmental species
protection184 and trespass and zoning enforcement.185
Ellickson characterizes these and other BLID goods and services as
local “public goods.”186 Public goods are available for consumption by
anyone, and consumption of a public good by one person does not reduce
the availability of that good to others. Truly public goods may not exist
anywhere but in the minds of economists; often roads, the air, and police
forces are cited as closest to the theoretical ideal. Ellickson’s “public
goods” fall outside of the traditional definition of public goods because,
while they have benefits to the general public—crime deterrence, say, or
aesthetic improvements leading to higher property values—they are
180
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primarily enacted to benefit private parties. Moreover, one person’s
consumption of certain potential BLID services, like the tot-lots, would
necessarily exclude others.187 At least some potential BLID services, then,
appear to function more like semicommonses—that is, resources that at
different times may be both publicly shared and privately captured—than
public goods.188 Indeed, like BLID services, microgrid-created renewable
energy functions as a semicommons because the energy is publicly created
and stored, and because renewable energy reduces the impact on the grid;
it becomes private, however, once an individual reduces that energy to
possession by consuming it.
The nature of the property protected requires special rules.
Accordingly, this proposal for BEDs differs from Ellickson’s proposal for
BLIDs in two important respects. First, if energy is the shared good, more
like a semicommons than a public good, states have to pass more specific
enabling legislation than what exists for general BLIDs. Specific rules
governing safety and interconnectivity will have to be articulated. Rules
relating to how energy might be stored, sold, or returned to the grid would
draw from public utility law and property law. Moreover, the rights of
stakeholders and any constraints on their ability to enter into business
arrangements with each other must be carefully conceived. Second, BEDs
should not be mandatory. To reduce the problem of the free rider,
Ellickson argues that all property owners within the BLID, whether they
supported or opposed its initial creation, should be obligated to chip in.189
Mandatory participation is inappropriate, however, in the microgrid
context, where the sharing of energy occurs on both shared and private
property and requires the installation of infrastructure on private
property.190 Requiring individuals to install piping, distribution lines, or
monitoring equipment on their property could result in takings claims,
something that both governments and microgrid operators would want to
avoid.
187
It may be important to note that because microgrids by definition require extensive monitoring,
tragedy of the commons problems do not exist in a microgrid. Individual users’ consumption of the
property (energy) would be monitored by meters that would allocate costs of energy use among users.
Norms among neighbors would prevent abuses other than over-use, such as failures to report technical
problems with equipment or siphoning energy without paying.
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The articulation of a model law for the creation of BEDs is beyond the
scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that specific legal institutions
must be created to address the unique problems posed by the microgrid. If
enacted along with the other modest reforms proposed in this Part, it is
possible that microgrids could begin to operate, with the full protection of
the law, within the decade.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even alternative energy has costs. Energy sprawl, an unintended and
harmful consequence of large-scale alternative energy projects, should
concern policymakers around the country. As this Article has shown,
microgrids provide decentralized, flexible energy infrastructure that can be
easily deployed in places already touched by development. They can meet
growing demand for energy without the negative consequences of larger
(or, for that matter, smaller) energy projects. Congress should act quickly
to require states to “consider” model microgrid standards, while the states
should provide guidance to localities on siting microgrids and should allow
private parties to enter into formal arrangements to share costs and risk.
Removing some of the barriers to microgrid development, even in an
incremental way, could radically transform future land use.

